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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this research is to evaluate the effect of family control over the profit
management in the listed companies on the Stock Exchange in Tehran. In this research, the
profit management is considered as the dependent variable and the control of the company is
considered as the independent variable. Dechow and Dichev and Kothari Models have been
used to measure the profit management. In addition, a dummy variable is used to measure the
company's control. The research population is the listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange
and the sample consisted of 32 family firms that were selected using systematic elimination
method. The research is from 2007 to 2012. Research hypotheses have been testedusing
correlation method between variables and multiple regression equations through panel data
method. The results suggest that family relations have a significant impact on the Board of
Directors on profit management using Dechow and Dichev, and Kothari Models.
Keywords: family firms, family control, family business, discretionary accruals, profit
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1. INTRODUCTION
Ownership structure is different (Hussaini, 1390). Ownership structure is classified into four
classes: 1.Institutional ownership, 2.Corporate ownership, 3. Management ownership,
4.Foreign ownership. Management investors are family firms that the majority of ownership is
possessed by a family or group family (Standard, 1390). In other words, family firms have been
recognized as an organization that is managed and controlled by several family members (Zehir
et al., 2011). Family members have ownership concentration and they are the member of the
board of directors and management team (Cheng, 2014). Leadership and management of a
company in itself are difficult and it becomes more difficult when the board members,
shareholders, and business consultants want better control of the company. Control and
monitoring the family-owned businesses is more difficult than companies whose owners are
strange. In family businesses, both families and homeowners interested in monitoring and
controlling or dominating. In family businesses, the lack of effective governance is the main
cause of organizational problems (Farmer, 2011). Most studies related to family firms have
been focused on the agency conflict framework (Change, 2014). Based on agency theory, the
conflict of interests concerns the owners (shareholders) so that they assess the performance of
managers to ensure the optimum allocation of resources by the management. Over time, it has
been found that some management decisions may be a waste of resources and loss of owners'
wealth. On the other hand, managers are always seeking to ensure the owners that their decision
is in the interests of the owners in addition to maximize their benefits (AkbariGhoroghchi,
2011). Regarding family firms, family members are the manager and the owner of a part of the
company stock. Therefore, these people are both the owner and the agency. No problem will be
created in the relationship of the agency and the owner until the company be looked from this
view. However, it should be noticed that in some companies, other people are the stockholder in
addition to family members, but they have no any management positions. Therefore, it is
possible that family members of the Board of Directors act as the detriment of other
shareholders and increase their wealth in this way (NaderiNayeri, 2013). According to
accounting theory, the main purpose of profit reporting is providing useful information for
people who are most interested in the financial statements. Assuming that, management thinks
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of its own interests, managers may manipulate managers may manipulate, or in other words,
manage the profit to gain the greatest benefits. Profit has an important role as an appropriate
index in investors' decision-making. Given that, managers are able to give misleading
information to the users by manipulating profit and profit management is a means to manipulate
profits by manager, the ownership structures need to pay more attention and the provided
information need to be analyzed (Mehrazin et al. 2013). Therefore, based on the mentioned
cases, it is necessary to examine profit management in family firms. Finally, this research seeks
to answer the question that whether the family control affects profit management practices.
Theoretical Principles and research literature
Family firms
Yang and Tsai (2008) mentioned at least ten percent of the shares ownership by family
members as a condition of family firms. Chakrabarty (2009) defines family firms as a firm, in
which a private person is as the controlling shareholder of the company or in other words, a
private person has at least twenty percent of the shares of a particular company. A family firm is
a firm whose shares are owned by a family and the family member are the Board of Directors or
in the management and operational positions (International Finance Corporation of the World
Bank, 2013).
The life cycle of family firms
Generally, family firms have three phases in their life cycle:
First generation: In this generation of family firms, one or more people are the owners and
shareholders. These shareholders form both the board of directors and the management team.
This leads to simplicity and ease of work, but the lack of distinction between ownership and
management may make the work difficult for independent people and they prefer to leave the
company.
Second generation: In this generation, there are usually several owners, but they all have a
contribution rate. Less activeowners enter the Board or only participate in plenary sessions, but
active shareholders managethe company. In this situation, there is often disagreement about
business strategy.
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Third Generation: The third-generation family firms often are bigger and require professional
management. The required consensus, competition, and ambition may not be found among
family members; therefore, there is an urgent need to manage from outside the family.
Managing the firm at this stage is very complicated and leads to conflict.
The Board of Directors in family firms
The Board of Directors is the central institution of many organizations, including
family-oriented organizations. The structure and composition of the board of directors in
family-oriented firms are different.In the first years of genesis, most of family organizations
formthe Board of Directors in order to comply with legal requirements. The duties of this board,
which are known as "The Board of Directors on paper" is mostly limited to approving financial
affairs, dividing profit, and other executive methods that requires the approval of the Board of
Directors. Their meetings are held twice a year according to legal requirements in very short
time with quick decision-making. The composition of these boards consists of only family
members and in some cases; a small number oftrusted senior managers are present.
The role of The Board of Directors
The main role of a well-functioningBoard of Directors is determining the company's overall
strategy, monitoring the performance of managers and ensuing the establishment of appropriate
firm governance, including overwhelming dominance of the environment, and the existence of
sufficient transparency mechanism is adequate to protect the minority rights. The amount of
time and effort for each field, which is allocated by the Board of Directors depend on the size
and complexity of the family business. For example, a company with a few shareholders,
simple business processes, efficient internal control and the level of participation of the owners
needs the focus of the Board of Directors on long-term strategy and planning. Family business
Board of Directors should bring value added to companies and avoid repeating what has already
been done by other companies by the authorities. For example, the Board of Directors should
lead the company's daily management and not directly involvein it, because it is primarily the
duty of the executive management of the company. In addition, the Board of Directors has the
freedom and resources to oversee and challenge the decisions and other activities by family
members or the management (ibid, 2013).
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The Foundation of Profit Management
The main role of financial reporting is transferring the financial information to persons outside
the organization in an appropriate and on time way. In doing so, the mangers have opportunities
in the financial reporting to judge. The managers could make use of their knowledge about the
financial activities to promote the efficacy of financial statements as a tool to transfer
information to the shareholders and potential creditors. Notwithstanding this, if the managers
intend to mislead the users of financial statements (inside or outside the organization) through
using their power in the accounting selections in financial statements, profit management may
occur (NaderiNiri, 2013). Hilly and Helen (1999) state that the profit management occurs only
when the mangers make use of their subjective judgments in the financial reporting and
manipulate the structure of transactions for the aim of changing the financial reporting. This
aim is either to mislead some of the profit owners concerning the economic performance of the
firm or to affect the results of transactions whose conclusions depend on achieving personal
profit (Royai and Mohammadi, 2011).
Control of family business and its impact on profit management
Several members of a family who are linked ties of kinship or marriage and manage the
family-owned businesses as owners, managers, or board members at the same time or over time
in the Company are named family businesses (Lopez Deigado&Dieguez Soto, 2015).
According to Gersic et al. (1997), family businesses are mainly in the form of companies in the
world. A dominant feature of these companies is that the control is concentrated in the hands of
a family group (Almeida- Santos et al, 2013). Management usually consists of family members
and the Board often has outsider individuals (Abdul-Manaf et al., 2013). According to Hu and
Yang (2001) when the Board of Directors is considered as the "under the control of the family"
that at least two or more family members to be appointed as controller (Jagg et al., 2009).
Involving family members in management allows them to have a wide range of information on
company operations. As a result, family members can be able to have flexible, timely, and
effective decisions. Since family members control the company's operations, so the company is
dominant. According to the entrenchment effect, the owner may engage in transactions that
involve their personal interests. Since the owners have control over the company's financial
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reports, they are able to manage their accounting data for their personal purposes. Since, they
are concerned with their families' reputation, so they provide high quality profits to protect the
family reputation (Abdul-Manaf et al., 2013). Considering the aforementioned principles, to
achieve the main objective of the study, the following hypotheses have been proposed and
tested:
H1: family relations have a significant impact in the Board of Directors on profit management
(Dechow and Dichev model).
H2: family relations have a significant impact in the Board of Directors on profit management
(Kothari model).
A Review of the Previous Research
Wang et al., (2010) conducted research entitled “Profit Management via Selling the
Properties”. The objective of this study was to examine the relation between profit
management, selling the long-term properties and investing in firms listed in Taiwan. This
shows that selling the properties is a way to manipulate the reported profits for 12484 firms and
for the period of 1984 to 2006. The obtained results showed that around 54-57 percent of the
companies in Taiwan with little loss manipulated the reported profits to show that the profit is
positive. Swang et al. (2013) in a study investigated “the Relation between the Profit
Management and Embezzlement of Assents”. The data for this study were gathered from the
173 firms which were proven to have conducted embezzlement between 2006 and 2010. To
examine the hypotheses, the linear and logistic regressions were utilized. The reported results
showed that there was a significant and positive association between embezzlements of the
assets anddiscretionary accruals. The accrual accounting basis not only provides cues to
discover the embezzlement of the profits, but also plays an important role in decreasing
information asymmetry. Chi et al, (2015) carried out research with the aim of investigating the
relation between family firms and profit management with the consideration of the effects of
undependability of the board of directors. In this study, 379 firms with more than seven years of
technology were chosen in Taiwan. The findings illustrated that there is a positive association
between the family firms and profit management. In addition, the researcher also found out that:
1) the ratio of independent directors is associated with the decrease of profit management in
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family firms. 2) the duality of obligations of the directors is associated with the increase of the
profit management in the family firms. The independency of the board of directors for a new
generating market to reduce the profit management behaviour from the family firms is
important.
Habash and Al-Ghamadi (2015) in an article examined the motivations of the profit
management in general firms in Saudi Arabia. In doing so, the researcher employed interviews
and questionnaires. The results indicated that increasing the amount of rewards, an acceptable
report of profit, averting losses, obtaining the bank loans, and increasing the price of the share
are among the motivations for Saudi directors to exercise profit management. MehrAzi et al.
(2013) did a study entitled “Familial Ownership, Non-family Firms and Profit Management”.
In this study, after analyzing all the firms accepted in the stock exchange, 31 firms found to be
family based. Then, they were separated to different industries. Next, following the same
number of firms and the same industries, other firms were randomly chosen and were
categorized as non-family firms. The modified model of Jones was taken into consideration for
examining the research hypotheses as well as calculating the profit management. The overall
results showed that there was a significant relation between the structure of the firm ownership
and profit management and the non-family firms exercise more profit management.
2. METHOD
Research Design
Methodologically speaking, this study is applied. The research is also naturalistic as it examines
the relation between the variables in their natural forms and without any manipulation. Thus, it
puts the study in the category of correctional study.
Population and Sample
To gather information related to the literature, a library research approach was used. The
population of this study involves all the firms accepted in Tehran Stock Exchange and to select
the samples a systematic sampling technique was employed. The sample of the study, by
considering, the said limitations and the variable of control of the firm (through examining the
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board of directors and the board of supervisors), 32 firms were selected from the firms accepted
in Tehran Stock Exchange.
Data Collection
To collect the data, the RahavardNovin and the official website of Tehran Stock Exchanges
were taken into account. To computerize the data, the Eviews software program was employed
and to test the hypotheses of the study, the correlation and regression analyses through the
Panel Data were used. In what follows, the research models and variables are introduced.
Evaluating the Variables
The Model Determining the Relation between the Discretionary Accruals (Profit
Management) and Firm Control
In the current study, the multiple regression, which is the main model of study, was employed to
examine the effects of family control on profit management actions.
Model (1)ACD  =  +  CCO  +  SIZE  +  LEV  +  ROE  +  ROA  −  AGE  +  
In that:
 …  : The estimated coefficient of the modelε  : estimating the error of the model
In Table 1, the variables of the model are presented:






The evaluation method Reference
ACD Dependent
Managing the profit with manipulating
discretionary accruals are evaluated via







Family firm control is conducted through
the investigation of the board of
(Almeida– Santos
etal,2013)
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directors and board of supervisors. If the
last name of the two are the same, this
firm is under the control of the family
which is evaluated by the designed
variable. If the firm is under the control
of family, number 1 is considered
otherwise number 0 is given.
SIZE
Control
The size of the firm is evaluated by the
natural logarithm of the whole assets of




Financial leverage is evaluated based on
the ratio of the whole debts to the
whole assets of the firm i in the year of t.
(Mahdavi et al., 2013)
ROE
The rate of return of shareholders' wage
is obtained from the division of net profit





Return on assets is obtained from the
ratio of the net profit to the whole assets




The life span of the firm is evaluated
based on the difference between the
year of t and year of establishment.
(Karami and Omrani,
2010).
Dechow and Dichev model
Using Dechow and Dichev model (2002), working capitalregression ofaccruals is calculated
for past, present, and future cash flows in addition to changes in revenue and gross value of
property, machinery, and equipment. Accruals quality is the standardized residuals of this
regression.
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Model (2)Accruals =  + β ∗ CF  + β ∗ CF  + β ∗ CF  +β ∗ ∆Revenue + β ∗ PPE  + ε
Model (3) Accruals = ∆CA  − ∆Cash  − ∆CL  − ∆STD  − Dep ∆CA  = Change in current assets∆Cash  = Change in cash/cash equivalents∆CL  = Change in current debt∆STD  = Change in short-term debtDep  = Amortization expense of fixed and intangible assets in year t.Cash Flows= cash flows∆Revenue= Change in revenuePPE  = The gross value of property, machinery, and equipment.
Kothari model
Kothari et al., (2005) modifiedJones model by adding the variable of return on assets (ROA) as
a control variable. The model is as follows:
Model (4) TACC  = α





+ α ROA  + ε TACC  = Total accruals of company i in year t.∆ sale  = Sale changes of company i in year t.PPE  = Net property, machinery, and equipment i in year t.ROA  = Return on assets (net income divided by average total assets) for i in year t-1.AT  = Total assets of company i in year t-1.
Model (5) TACC  = (∆CA  − ∆Cash  − ∆CL  ∆STD  − Dep  )/laggedAT∆CA  = Change in current assets from year t-1 to the year t.∆Cash  = Change in cash and cash equivalents of year t-1 to year t.∆CL  = Change in current debt of year t-1 to year t.∆STD  = Change in current portion of long-term debt from year t-1 to year t.
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Dep  = Amortization expense of fixed and intangible assets in year t.laggedAT= Total assets of company i in year t-1.
To calculate the non-discretionary accruals, themodified Jones model is acted by adding ROA
as follows:
Model (6) NDACC  = β





+ β ROA  + ε ∆ REC  = Change in net accounts and commercial receivables of company i in the year t.
And finally, to obtain discretionary accruals (DACC  ), total accruals (TACC  ) is deducted to
non-discretionary accruals (NDACC  ) as follows:




In order to test the hypothesis, a pre-test is needed to be conducted. In this paper, the Chow test
is used to determine the cross fixed and time constant effects that its scale should be smaller
than 0.05. Since, in this paper, the probability is smaller than 0.05, the cross fixed effects are
confirmed and the time constant effects are rejected. In order to determine the random-effects
and fixed-effects, Hausman test is used. If the probability is smaller than 0.05, the
random-effects are rejected and the fixed-effects are confirmed. According to the conducted
tests, the fixed effects are confirmed. The results of hypothesis testing in this method are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Analysis of the first hypothesis (the calculation of profit management by using





The probability (Prob) 0
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According to F-statistic and its probability, it can be concluded that the regression equation is
significant at 99% confidence level. The results of the Durbin – Watson statistic (the lack of
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adjusted coefficient of determination in the model expresses the degree of relevance of
independent variables and the dependent variable (profit management). According to Table 2,
the adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.52. Therefore, on average, 52 percent of
dependent variables are explained by this model. According to the test results of the model
related to variables, the company control variable (CCO) is likely less than 0.01. Therefore, this
variable is significant at a confidence level of 99% in the model. In addition, the covariates of
company age (AGE) and financial leverage (LEV) have a probability of less than 0.01 and the
variable of company size (SIZE) is likely less than 0.05. Thus, these variables aresignificant at a
confidence level of 99% and 95%, respectively. However, return on equity (ROE) and return on
assets (ROA) variables have been more likely than 0.05 and they are not significant in the
model at 95% confidence level. Considering the significance, the company control variable
(CCO), which is the main variable of the model in confirming or rejecting the hypothesis, it can
be claimed that the family relations are effective in the Board of Directors on profit
management (Dechow and Dichev model). Therefore, according to the results, the first
hypothesis is confirmed.
Hypothesis 2 (H2)
The results of hypothesis testing in this method are presented in Table 3.


































































































According to F-statistic and its probability, it can be concluded that the regression equation is
significant at 99% confidence level. The results of the Durbin – Watson statistic (the lack of
correlation of error terms) for the model indicate the relative independence of the data. The
adjusted coefficient of determination in the model expresses the degree of relevance of
independent variables and the dependent variable (profit management). According to Table 3,
the adjusted coefficient of determination is 0.77. Therefore, on average, 77 percent of
dependent variables are explained by this model. According to the test results of the model
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related to variables, the company control variable (CCO) is likely less than 0.01. Therefore, this
variable is significant at a confidence level of 99% in the model. In addition, the covariates of
the return on assets (ROA), financial leverage (LEV) and the company size (SIZE) have a
probability of less than 0.01 and the variable of company age (AGE) is likely less than 0.05.
Thus, these variables aresignificant at a confidence level of 99% and 95%, respectively.
Considering the significance, the company control variable (CCO), which is the main variable
of the model in confirming or rejecting the hypothesis, it can be claimed that the family
relations are effective in the Board of Directors on profit management (Kothari model).
Therefore, according to the results, the second hypothesis is confirmed.
4. Discussion and Conclusion:
The results of the first hypothesis showed that family relations are effective in the Board of
Directors on profit management (Dechow and Dichev model). In Dechow and Dichev model,
there is a direct relationship between cash flow and accruals in the current period. Since, the
cash flows reflect that continuous income and productive operation is important for all
participants, including shareholders, creditors, management, etc. This model has been created
with this assumption that the occurring time of incomes and costs in the company is often
different from the time of receipt and payment of cash. Accruals are reported as a result of this
difference. Accounting system provides temporary modifications that alter the cash flows over
time through accruals.In this case, accruals items act as a tool that misleads the users of the
financial statements. In other words, these items can also affect cash flow because of access
management, which leads to wrong decisions of the users. For example, creditors are mistaken
for continued accreditation. Therefore, this issue gives the managers of family firms the
opportunity to act to their interest and to the detriment of other shareholders. The results of this
hypothesis are inconsistent with the research results of Khajavi et al. (2013). The second
hypothesis results showed that family relations are effective in the Board of Directors on profit
management (Kothari model). Kothari et al. adjusted the Jones model by adding the variable of
return on assets that one of the profitability criteria is the return on assets rate. In fact, return on
assets is a basic criterion to assess management performance. Performance assessment shows
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the amount of organizational success in achieving the goals. If these company managers can
maximize the profit, then they have a suitable performance by achieving the company aims.
Managers manage the reported profits according to the different goals and incentives such as
impact on stock prices, maximizing their utility and welfare. Since, family members control
theoperations in family firms and dominant it; they control the financial reports. Therefore, they
manage the profit to achieve their goals and showing the good picture of companyprofitability.
The results of this hypothesis are similar to the results of Jaggi et al. (2009).
The market decision makers and potential shareholders are recommended to consider the
impact of family ownership on the information quality in reviewing the financial transparency
of the studied companies. In addition, family firms managers are recommended to avoid
applying the profit managementmeasures because this issue is perceived by the market in the
long term and it will lead to negative results for the company. In order to efficient use of the
research results and to clarify the impact of family control over the actions of profit
management, it is proposed to investigate the effect of family control issues, the independence
of the Board of Directors and profit management in family firms, the effect of family control
over the quality of financial reporting in family firms, the effect of corporate governance and
profit management in family and nonfamily firms. The future researches are recommended to
test this study with different statistical population and for more years to increase the external
validity of the research not only in the Tehran Stock Exchange, but also on other stock
exchanges of the world, and provide moreand deeper information in this field. In addition,
comparative studies between family and nonfamily firms in Tehran Stock Exchange and other
stock exchanges in the world are recommended.
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